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WILLIAM B. MooRE**
I. Why Pollution Taxes?
Our present tax system primarily taxes functions that
our society seeks to encourage: income, capital formation,
payrolls, sales and property. Any tax places a burden on the
function taxed, so the effect of these taxes is to depress in-
come, employment and sales, discourage capital formulation
and decrease property values.
* Richard Ottinger was appointed Dean of Pace University School of Law
in the Fall of 1994. Dean Ottinger came to Pace University when he retired
from Congress in 1984. As a professor he taught in the environmental law pro-
gram. As co-director of the Center for Environmental Legal Studies, he has
been involved with students in pursuing a major utility reform program. In his
sixteen years as a member of the House of Representatives, he authored a sub-
stantial body of energy and environmental laws. He founded the Environment
and Energy Study Conference, the largest bipartisan, bicameral caucus in Con-
gress, and was one of the earliest environmentalists in Congress in 1965. As
Chairman of the Energy Conservation and Power Subcommittee (Energy &
Commerce Committee), he was instrumental in adopting such key statutes as
the Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act. Dean Ottinger was a founding staff
member of the Peace Corps, serving it during 1961-1964.
** William B. Moore is a graduate of Utah State University (B.S. Environ-
mental Studies), UCLA (J.D. 1982) and Pace University (LL.M. 1994)(Environ-
mental Law). He is presently serving on the faculty of the University of flinois
School of Law teaching and conducting research in the areas of environmental
and energy law.
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Indeed, the distortionary effect of the existing tax system
places an enormous burden on the United States economy in
terms of lost business, work and savings.
If considerable government revenues could be raised in
non-distorting ways, allowing reductions in taxes on in-
come, payroll and profits, the real economic savings would
be huge .... substituting $100 billion of non-distorting
taxes for a mix of current federal taxes yielding the same
revenue might easily generate $40 to $60 billion yearly in
additional real income. This potential-tax reform dividend
is as large as the much-heralded peace dividend.1
It is much sounder social policy to tax functions society
wishes to discourage than those which it seeks to encourage.
Hence, increasing attention is being focused, particularly in
Europe and Japan and in international forums, on taxing pol-
lution. In the United States, there has been a tendency on
the part of governmental entities in recent years to impose
"sin taxes" as excises on activities society wishes to discour-
age, most prominently the sale of tobacco products, liquor,
guns and the like. A pollution tax can be considered a type of
"sin tax."2
Pollution taxes are also a sound environmental instru-
ment. The principal means of controlling pollution in the
United States is by command and control regulation, setting
standards or limits on emissions and requiring particular pol-
lution control technologies.3 Command and control regula-
tion of pollution, while necessary to assure pollution
reductions, has its limits. While much more certain of reduc-
ing pollution than pollution taxes would be, controls tend to
be set only at levels that are politically acceptable. Seldom
are the full social costs of pollution eliminated in pollution
control standards, except where particularly noxious prod-
ucts are banned outright, such as the prohibitions against
1. ROBERT REPETrO ET AL., WoRLD REsouRcEs INSTITUTE, GREEN FEES:
HoW A TAX SHIFT CAN WORK FOR THE ENvIRoNMENT AND THE ECONOmy 4 (Nov.
1992).
2. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 5701 (1992).
3. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENvmoNmENTAL REGULATION 420 (1992).
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol12/iss1/6
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use of asbestos, DDT and lead in gasoline in the United
States.4 Furthermore, when standards are adopted, there is
no incentive provided for emitters to exceed those standards
or to develop better pollution control technologies.
Pollution taxes burden activities society wants to dis-
courage. They provide an incentive to create new environ-
mental technologies and efficiencies to promote pollution
prevention. They allow the affected polluters to react to the
tax incentives in the most economically efficient manner,
without prescribing particular control technologies, as many
of the command and control regulations do.
Pollution taxes conform to longstanding Pigouvian eco-
nomic theory that the polluter should pay for the damages
caused to society by its pollution, and that the costs to society
from pollution should be incorporated into the polluter's
prices. Thus, the market place can be used to promote manu-
facture of less polluting products and to encourage use of less
polluting processes.
Pollution taxes promote efficiency improvements in in-
dustry that can make the taxed manufacturers more competi-
tive. They foster the development of new pollution
prevention and control technologies which open up new busi-
ness and job opportunities.5 They promote efficiencies in the
use of energy which can lower energy bills, again fostering
competitiveness.
Furthermore, in a time of revenue stringency for all
levels of government, pollution taxes create substantial reve-
nues that can be used to balance budgets and for environ-
mental purposes. This would alleviate the economic gross,
sectoral and equity impacts of existing taxes.
Our country is not without experience with pollution
taxes. Most particularly, Congress adopted a tax on chlorin-
ated fluorocarbons (CFCs) in 1990 to accelerate the phase-out
4. R IcHAiD OTTINGER ET AL., ENvIRONMENTAL COSTS OF ELECTRICITY 562
(1990).
5. A- MILLER & C-. MOORE, CENTER FOR GLOBAL CHANGE, UNIVERSITY OF
MARYLAND AT COLLEGE PARK, GREEN GOLD - ENViRoNmENTAL TECHNOLOGY
AND THE RAcE To CAPTuRE INDUsmIAL DoMINANCE OF THE 21ST CENTURY (Sept.
1993).
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of these stratospheric ozone depleting chemicals. 6 The Clean
Air Act also contains a number of fees for violation of stan-
dards that are geared to pollutant emissions and act very
similarly to pollution taxes. The Clean Air Act specifies that
pollution taxes are one authorized means by which states can
meet its air emission requirements.7
II. Addressing Pollution Tax Problems
A. Competitive Concerns
Perhaps the chief concern about pollution taxes, as it is
with other taxes, is that they may create a competitive disad-
vantage for the affected taxpayers vis d vis competitors in
other jurisdictions which impose no such taxes or impose
them at lower rates. This concern applies to international
trade at the federal level and to interstate competition at the
state level. Pollution taxes can be offset by reductions in
other taxes, however, to ameliorate their economic impacts.
Competitive concerns about a revenue-neutral tax ex-
change should be far less than concerns about a tax without
offsets. Furthermore, the distortionary effects of taxes on in-
come, capital and labor create much greater competitive dis-
advantages than do taxes on pollution, which tend to promote
domestic investment and labor. The switch from traditional
taxes to pollution taxes should, therefore, create, on average,
a competitive advantage to state enterprises.
Finally, a recent study demonstrates that tighter pollu-
tion requirements induce affected enterprises to become more
efficient, thus more competitive. The added efficiencies cre-
ate new businesses to manufacture the more efficient
processes and pollution control devices, which in turn create
new export business opportunities for the affected
industries.8
6. I.R.C. § 4681 (1990).
7. Clean Air Act § 101,42 U.S.C. § 7401 (West 1983). See J. Andrew Hoer-
ner, New Clean Air Bill Directs States To Collect Environmental Taxes, 49 TAX
NoTEs 944 (1990).
8. A. Miller, supra note 5.
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol12/iss1/6
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There will still be industrial sectors particularly im-
pacted by pollution taxes. However this effect is not com-
pletely undesirable. For example, since coal combustion is so
intimately related with a variety of emissions, it is environ-
mentally desirable to eliminate. Some of the sting can be al-
leviated by using a portion of the tax revenues to assist
manufacturers to diversify and to retrain workers. Competi-
tive concerns with respect to pollution taxes can also be par-
tially addressed by taxing imports of the offending products
and exempting exports from the tax.
B. Tax Rate
There are concerns deriving from the size of the tax. Ide-
ally, the size of the tax should be high enough to prevent
emissions at levels which cause damage to society, but this
may be politically difficult to achieve. To the extent the taxes
are high, there will be more competitive pressures with which
to deal. On the other hand, small taxes will have much
smaller pollution-reducing effects.9 However, it is better to
have a tax at a small level producing some pollution-reducing
effects than to have no tax and thus no pollution reductions.
Taxes can be phased higher over time as experience with
them is gained.
It should be noted that a much lower tax can produce the
same environmental improvement if some of the revenues are
used for pollution reduction. Thus, a New York study shows
that a carbon stabilization target could be achieved at a sig-
nificantly lower cost if the revenues were used solely for car-
bon reductions, and that this use of revenues would also
substantially offset the regressive effects of the tax.10
9. CHRISTOPmER STONE, THE GNAT IS OLDER THAN MAN 136-41 (Princeton
U. Press 1993).
10. Ajay K. Sanghi & Anthony L. Joseph, Taxing Pollution Instead of La-
bor: Is it a Prudent CO2 Reduction Policy?, 6 ELECTRICITY J. 51 (Jan. - Feb.
1993). See also, A. SANGm ET AL., N.Y. STATE ENERGY OFFICE STATE LEVEL IM-
PACTS OF A FEDERAL CARBON TAX: A NEw YORK STATE EXAMPLE (for presenta-
tion at the 84th Annual Meeting & Exhibition, Vancouver, British Columbia,
June 16 - 21, 1991).
1994] 107
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C. Pollution Substitution
A concern relating particularly to carbon taxes is that
taxing fossil fuel emissions without taxing nuclear power en-
vironmental risks will unfairly advantage nuclear power and
thus promote increases in nuclear risks.". It is for this rea-
son that the European Community is proposing to combine
carbon taxes with broader taxes on energy. A better solution
would be to also tax nuclear fuel processing and nuclear
waste.
D. Spiking
A concern pertaining to taxes on pollution that is local in
nature is the spiking problem. Spiking is the notion that pol-
lution damage is a function not just of what is being added to
the environment but also of pollution already present from
existing sources. The effects of cumulative pollution may
vary sharply from place to place within a jurisdiction.12 The
taxes need to be adjusted, where appropriate, to take account
of these differences. Since carbon dioxide emissions affect
global environmental problems, however, this spiking prob-
lem would not be applicable to a carbon tax.
E. Revenue Erosion
Another problem with all pollution taxes where the reve-
nues are important is that, to the extent the tax is successful
in reducing pollution, the tax base is eroded. Funds from tax
proceeds sought to provide general revenues, clean up the en-
vironment, help with sectoral and equity impact alleviation,
or support offsets from other taxes will be eroded.' 3 The solu-
tion is to phase in a gradually increasing tax over time, or at
least over the relevant planning horizon. Eventually, as opti-
mal carbon tax levels are achieved, other tax options, prefera-
bly taxes on other pollutants, will have to be substituted.
11. STONE, supra note 9.
12. Id.
13. Id.
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol12/iss1/6
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F. Point of Imposition
At what point to impose the taxes is another important
issue. Administrative ease and enforcement considerations
dictate that the taxes be imposed as far upstream as possible.
Upstream taxes are a blunt instrument, however, failing to
account for pollution control measures that may occur further
downstream.14 Therefore, where emissions can be readily
measured and monitored, it is far better to tax the actual
downstream emissions.
G. Avoidance
Another problem that must be addressed is the problem
of avoidance and enforcement. The higher the tax, the
greater the incentive is to avoid it by moving business activi-
ties across the border or by illegal imports from other juris-
dictions or from Native American nations in the United
States. Particularly problems occur with taxes on petroleum
distribution which is a very thin-margin business where a
few cents per gallon can be a large difference. As the differ-
ence between taxed and untaxed product grows, so does the
incentive for evasion.
Great difficulty is experienced now with fuel tax evasion.
Additional enforcement measures should be part of any pack-
age, particularly one that increases state-level petroleum tax-
ation. Also, state-federal cooperation in assuring compliance
with gasoline taxes has been effective and should be pursued
in enforcement of state pollution taxes.
H. Exemptions
There will also be pressures for exemptions - for farm-
ers, governments and non-profit organizations - that need
to be considered. Present federal and state taxes on energy
are rife with such exemptions.' 5 Exemptions should not be
considered, however, particularly for downstream pollution
14. For example, the use of scrubbers or "clean coal" technologies.
15. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6427 (1994).
1994] 109
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taxes, since exemptions there would seriously erode the envi-
ronmental effects desired.
I. False Perception of Solution
Lastly, adoption of a pollution tax may give the false im-
pression that the pollution problems subject to the tax have
been resolved. Rarely, however, will a tax alone be sufficient
for bringing pollution within acceptable limits. The tax is
useful as an incentive to speed compliance with regulations,
as with the United States-adopted CFC tax, and to go beyond
the standards set by regulation, encouraging adoption of new
technologies. This should be clearly stated at the time of
adoption of a pollution tax.
III. Carbon Tax Considerations
Of particular recent interest has been consideration of
carbon taxes as a means of meeting the international goals
for stabilizing global climate change. This was proposed at
the United Nations Conference of Environment and Develop-
ment (UNCED).16 Individual countries were given the re-
sponsibility to develop their own strategies for meeting goals
the Climate Change Convention adopted.17 The European
Community has under consideration a carbon tax and a
number of European countries have already adopted carbon
taxes on their own as means of meeting these Convention
targets.
The overwhelming majority of carbon dioxide releases
come from combustion of fossil fuels at utilities, in industrial
processes and in motor vehicles. Carbon taxes can take a va-
riety of forms, largely dependent on the point at which the
tax is imposed. In each case, the objective is to create the
maximum reduction of carbon dioxide emitted with maxi-
mum economic efficiency. The tax can be imposed at any
16. This conference was held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, June 1992. The con-
vention worked as an international forum to form future agreements and trea-
ties that affect the environment, development and resources of the Earth.
17. G-. Res. 45/212, UNCED, 5th Sess. U.N. Doc. A/AC. 237/18 (Part I1)
(1992) reprinted in AGENDA 21 & THE UNCED PROCEEDINGS 1685 - 1713
(Nicholas A. Robinson ed. 1992).
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol12/iss1/6
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point between the extraction of carbon-rich fuel sources as a
proxy for carbon dioxide emissions, to the emissions
themselves.
For a state carbon tax, on the surface it would appear
easiest from an administrative and enforcement standpoint
to impose the tax "upstream" at the mine mouth for coal or
the well-head for oil or natural gas. However, there are sev-
eral problems with this upstream taxation. It gives no credit
for controls or improved combustion processes that may be
added downstream to reduce carbon emissions. It gives no
incentives to develop technologies for carbon dioxide emission
reductions and it imposes administrative difficulties for treat-
ment of high-carbon fuels imported into a state. States can
impose taxes on imported goods, under the Commerce Clause
of the United States Constitution,18 so long as the taxes are
non-discriminatory, the same for imported fuels as for domes-
tically produced fuels.
States could also impose a "midstream" tax on the carbon
content of imported fuels at their point of entry into the state,
whether by truck, tanker, rail or pipeline' 9 or at the utility or
fuel distribution center to which the fuels are delivered. Tax-
ation at the point of delivery also gives no credit for more effi-
cient combustion processes or for other emission reduction
technologies, but is probably easiest administratively.
Finally, the tax could be imposed on the emissions them-
selves at the point of use. This might be relatively easy for
utilities and large industrial facilities where the emissions
can be readily measured and monitored, but virtually impos-
sible to administer relative to each commercial or residential
fuel combustion or with respect to motor vehicles. To the ex-
tent that actual emissions can be measured and monitored,
however, taxation downstream of the emissions is the best
option environmentally and from the standpoint of economic
efficiency, since technological improvements can be fully
taken into account.
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
19. This could be feasible but administratively even more burdensome.
1994] ill
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In the United States, a national carbon tax was consid-
ered by the Clinton Administration as one of the instruments
for alleviating our budget deficit. The tax was rejected by the
Administration on the basis of the anticipated political diffi-
culties flowing from its large impacts on coal-producing
states, particularly since the head of the Senate Appropria-
tions Committee was from West Virginia. The Administra-
tion instead opted for a Btu tax which it subsequently had to
abandon because of the political resistance from affected
interests.
Based on this experience, it is unlikely that energy taxes
or energy-related pollution taxes will again be visited at the
federal level for the foreseeable future. Therefore, it is timely
for states to consider pioneering in adoption of taxes on car-
bon and other pollutants.
IV. Why State Pollution Taxes?
State taxes on income, capital, payrolls, sales and prop-
erty impose particularly great burdens on state economies.
They act not only to burden state businesses and residents,
discouraging them from investing and working, but they also
drive investment interests and workers from the state. Re-
cent studies show that the competitive disadvantages to a
state of these traditional taxes are very great.20
The logic of substituting pollution taxes for traditional
state taxes is particularly great since improving the local en-
vironment will not only have positive health and environmen-
tal effects for existing state residents, but it will also make
the state more of an attraction for business investment and
labor immigration. Thus, substitution of environmental
charges can raise revenues while improving environmental
quality and reducing taxes that drive businesses and workers
away from the state.
20. REPgTTO ET AL., supra note 1 at 4-6 (citing Timothy J. Bartik, Business
Location Decisions in the United States: Estimates of the Effects of Unioniza-
tion, Taxes, and Other Characteristics of States, 3(1) J. Bus. & ECON. STAT., 14,
14-22 (1985).
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol12/iss1/6
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A tax switch to pollution taxes should also be politically
attractive. Making polluters pay for the damages they im-
pose on society should be much more palatable than taxing
people's income, capital, payrolls, sales and property. Indeed,
the public seems to accept only taxes specifically tied to bene-
fits, like the social security tax even though it is highly re-
gressive. Emphasis should be placed on the reduction of their
traditional tax bills and the opportunity to mitigate pollution
taxes by reducing pollution-causing activity.
At present, the only way most people can reduce their tax
bill is to work less and earn less income. The American
public is overwhelmingly in favor of environmental protec-
tion. If environmental charges were in place, they could
instead reduce their tax bills by, for instance, saving en-
ergy, bicycling to work, or recycling.21
States have traditionally been a crucible for experimen-
tation with new concepts, proving their practicality and thus
paving the way for federal legislation, particularly in the en-
vironmental field. California pioneered in setting appliance
efficiency standards which were later adopted by Congress.
California is now playing a similar role with respect to non-
polluting vehicles. Adoption of state carbon and other pollu-
tion taxes could demonstrate their feasibility and pave the
way for future federal action.
State carbon taxes have been resisted as being inconse-
quential in addressing global problems of climate change.
This is not true, however. Consider the following: "Only six
foreign nations release more CO 2 than Texas. Texas green-
house emissions exceed those of Canada, Poland or Italy and
Argentina combined. California contributes more to global
warming than Spain, South Korea or South Africa."2 2 As
demonstrated Table 1, New York contributes more pollution
than three quarters of the nations of the world including
21. Id. at 12.
22. F. Muller & JJ.A Hoerner, The Promise of State Carbon Taxes: Opportu-
nities and Policy Issues, STATE TAX NOTES 530 (1993).
1994] 113
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Belgium, Yugoslavia, Nigeria, Greece, Iraq, Iran, Switzer-
land, Israel and all the Scandinavian countries together.
Adoption of a carbon tax at the state level, therefore, can
have meaningful impact on the global warming threat in and
of itself, and even more so as an example which other states
and the federal government can follow. If each state and
country adopts an attitude that its small contribution to the
global problem is too insignificant to matter, nothing will ever
get done to address the problem.
A number of states have already acted on various non-
tax measures to reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases.
Vermont has developed a comprehensive plan to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions and non-renewable energy con-
sumption per capita as a result of a 1989 gubernatorial di-
rective. In 1992, the Connecticut legislature directed that
the state energy plan include a C02 emissions reduction
level . .. New York, Massachusetts, California, and Ne-
vada [and recently Wisconsin] have all assigned explicit
monetary costs to C02 emissions for purposes of doing
least-cost planning. A host of other initiatives are in place
in other states.2 3
Table 1
Total Total
Rank Nation/State Emissions Rank Nation/State Emissions
1 United States 5,3238.7 59 Washington 65.9
2 U.S.S.R. 4,116.3 60 Kansas 64.1
3 China 2,517.2 61 Sweden 63.7
4 Japan 1,069.3 62 Pakistan 63.4
5 India 695.5 63 Maryland 63.4
6 Germany, Dem. Rep. 692.5 64 Colorado 59.0
7 United Kingdom 618.9 65 Iowa 57.5
23. Id. at 530 n. 5 (stating for a review of state initiatives on global warm-
ing, see P. WExLER, CENTER FOR GLOBAL CHANGE REPORT, COOL TooLs: STATE
N LocAL PoLicY OPTIONS To CONFRONT A CHANGING CLIMATE (1992); AN-
DREW SILBERGER & RON GRAvis, THE BRUCE COMPANY, SELECTED SUMMARY OF
CURRENT STATE RESPONSES TO CLIMATE CHANGE (July 1992)).
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol12/iss1/6
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Table 1 (continued)
Total Total
Rank Nation/State Emissions Rank Nation/State Emissions
8 Texas 568.7 66 Arizona 56.8
9 Canada 495.7 67 South Carolina 56.2
10 Poland 477.8 68 Columbia 55.9
11 Italy 409.6 69 Finland 55.7
12 France 380.5 70 Austria 54.4
United Arab
13 Mexico 339.5 71 Emirates 54.2
14 California 322.5 72 Malaysia 51.4
15 South Africa 302.2 73 Wyoming 51.4
16 Australia 280.3 74 Denmark 50.7
17 Czechoslovakia 243.5 75 Norway 50.0
18 Pennsylvania 232.7 76 Utah 49.1
19 South Korea 227.0 77 New Mexico 48.9
20 Romania 226.2 78 Algeria 47.7
21 Ohio 222.7 79 Arkansas 46.9
22 Brazil 214.4 80 Mississippi 45.8
23 Spain 210.6 81 Phillipines 43.0
24 Louisiana 188.0 82 Portugal 41.8
25 New York 187.8 83 Switzerland 40.3
26 Indiana 187.5 84 Libya 40.2
27 Saudi Arabia 186.3 85 North Dakota 40.0
28 Illinois 184.4 86 Singapore 38.6
29 Iran 176.2 87 Israel 35.0
30 Florida 170.3 88 Connecticut 34.9
31 Michigan 161.6 89 Kuwait 34.4
32 Indonesia 144.1 90 Alaska 31.8
33 Yugoslavia 141.8 91 Ireland 31.5
34 Netherlands 135.8 92 Nebraska 29.8
35 Argentina 127.8 93 Syria 29.1
36 Georgia 126.8 94 Oregon 28.4
37 Turkey 125.9 95 New Zealand 28.3
13
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Table 1 (continued)
Total Total
Rank Nation/State Emissions Rank Nation/State Emissions
Trinidad and
38 Bulgaria 114.9 96 Tobago 20.3
39 Kentucky 108.7 97 Maine 16.5
40 Belgium 104.4 98 Ecuador 15.8
41 New Jersey 104.2 99 Delaware 15.4
42 Venezuela 103.2 100 Qatar 14.5
43 Alabama 101.8 101 Bahrain 13.4
44 West Virginia 98.6 102 New Hampshire 13.0
45 North Carolina 98.2 103 South Dakota 10.4
46 Tennessee 97.0 104 Idaho 10.3
47 Missouri 94.8 105 Luxembourg 9.9
48 Nigeria 85.4 106 Gabon 8.5
49 Virginia 84.1 107 Coted' Ivoire 8.0
50 Egypt 82.3 108 Rhode Island 7.4
51 Oklahoma 79.6 109 Vermont 4.8
52 Thailand 77.4 110 Cyprus 4.1
Dist. of
53 Wisconsin 77.4 111 Columbia 4.0
54 Massachusetts 74.1 112 Costa Rica 2.5
55 Greece 71.0 113 Guinea-Bissau 2.5
56 Minnesota 70.6 114 Nicaragua 2.3
57 Iraq 69.1 115 Iceland 2.1
58 Hungary 68.5 116 Malta 1.8
117 Paraguay 1.7
V. Getting States to Consider and Pass Pollution
Taxes
State and local governments already impose a wide vari-
ety of taxes on energy consumption, including taxes on gaso-
line, diesel fuel, utilities and Btu, as well as a potpourri of
related taxes such as severance taxes. The problem with en-
ergy taxes is that they may fall equally on clean and dirty
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol12/iss1/6
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fuels. Being narrowly imposed on energy, they require a
higher level of tax to achieve the same revenue and pollution
reduction than a broader based carbon tax. Carbon taxes are
broadly distributed over residential, commercial and indus-
trial taxpayers and an appropriate share is born by interstate
commerce and tourism.24 Energy taxes also are likely to en-
counter more political resistance than pollution taxes which
can be supported on the basis of making polluters pay for the
environmental costs they impose on society.
Carbon taxes do not have to have large economic effects.
A modest ten dollars per ton state carbon tax would impose a
very low economic burden. Even with a utility which has a
fuel mix of ninety percent coal, the price increase would only
be 2.8 mills per kWh, or less than a gross receipts tax of five
percent which is well within the range of existing state en-
ergy taxes. For most utilities, with lower proportions of coal
in their fuel mix, the effects on prices would be considerably
less. Furthermore, if the response to a carbon tax is to in-
crease energy efficiency, the savings may more than offset the
tax.25
Legislation for small state carbon taxes was introduced
in Maryland in 1992, in Minnesota in 1990 and in California
last year. While none of these bills were adopted, the Mary-
land proposal was the subject of legislative hearings26 and
the bill was dropped only in a last minute settlement by the
houses of the legislature.2 7
There is a tremendous aversion to taxes in the United
States today. The failure of the very modest federal Btu tax
which was proposed by the Clinton Administration to help
balance the budget demonstrates this aversion to taxes. Re-
cent state elections also demonstrate this aversion, most no-
tably the New Jersey gubernatorial election, which hinged in
large part on voter aversion to taxation.
24. Id. at 531-32.
25. Id. at 534.
26. Small State Carbon Taxes: Hearings on S.665 Before the Subcommittee
on Budget and Taxation of the Maryland Senate Comm. (1992).
27. F. Muller & J.A. Hoerner, supra note 22 at 541-44.
1994] 117
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It may be, therefore, that the only way to get pollution
taxes introduced initially will be on a revenue-neutral basis,
shifting tax burdens from income and capital to polluting ac-
tivities. This should be very attractive politically, particu-
larly in light of a study published by EPA researchers
demonstrating that a shift from federal taxes on capital and
business income to a federal carbon tax could produce a sig-
nificant national economic stimulus because of the greater
economic efficiency of a carbon tax.28 If this phenomenon can
be demonstrated at the state level, pollution taxes, properly
presented, could be very saleable.
Revenue-neutral pollution taxes could encompass offsets
to alleviate the economic burden to the state from the taxes,
the sectoral impacts on energy-intensive industries particu-
larly affected and the equity impacts on low income people.
Consideration should also be given to using some of the tax
revenues for pollution reduction.29 It might be possible to
garner support from utilities for the tax exchange if utility
gross receipts taxes, particularly anathema to the utilities,
were reduced and if the pollution taxes were to replace use of
externality values in resource selection.
States today are very concerned about avoiding economic
hardship from loss of business to other states and about pro-
moting economic development within their borders. Many
states, like New York, import most of their fuels today, so a
carbon tax or other taxes on air pollution would have the ef-
fect of discouraging these fuel imports and substituting in-
state spending on energy efficiency, thus discouraging the ex-
port of jobs and encouraging in-state employment. It should
be possible to demonstrate that there will be a net economic
stimulus to the state from shifting to pollution taxes.
Of course, all taxes burden the taxpayers affected and
there would be negative sectoral impacts of a carbon tax, par-
ticularly on energy-intensive industries and on the producers
of fossil fuels, the combustion of which produces high carbon
28. Robert Shackleton et. al, The Efficiency Value of Carbon Tax Revenues
(Mar. 27, 1992) (unpublished draft manuscript, on file with the Pace University
School of Law Energy Project, Center for Environmental Legal Services).
29. Ajay K. Sanghi & Anthony L. Joseph, supra note 10.
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol12/iss1/6
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dioxide emissions. Consumption taxes are also likely to affect
a higher proportion of income of poor people. Some of the rev-
enues of the taxes should, therefore, be used to alleviate these
sectoral and equity effects.
The best way to promote adoption of a state tax shift
from business and income taxes to a carbon tax and other pol-
lution taxes is to perform a highly credible study to determine
the economic impacts of the taxes on the state's economy and
the industrial sectors within the state. The study should
also determine the impact on low income residents, and the
ability of the offsets to alleviate these pollution tax impacts.
The Pace University Center for Environmental Legal
Studies and Tellus Institute have proposed such a study for
New York. We chose to study a state carbon tax. The study
also concentrates on a variety of uses of the revenues from
these taxes to address gross economic impacts and sectoral
and equity effects, to reduce pollution and to derive state
revenues.
We are hopeful that, armed with a study which shows
significant net state benefits from such a tax exchange, we
can persuade the New York Governor and Legislature to be-
come the first state to adopt a carbon tax and a pioneer in
promoting taxes on pollution.
1994] 119
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